

THE PRO ACT: WHAT UNION CONTRACTORS NEED TO KNOW

Ryan McCabe Poor, Ice Miller LLP

The [Protecting the Right to Organize \(PRO\) Act of 2021 \(H.R. 842\)](#) was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on February 4, 2021, as a bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act, the Labor Management Relations Act, and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. AGC of America opposes the bill. In light of the bill's title, with its sole reference to union organizing, union construction contractors might assume that the legislation would not harm them, because they are already organized, and might even help them, because it would be in their best interests to see their open shop competition organized as well. However, the PRO Act does not just address union organizing. I

4p- ic15 ž 2 a p isecopy activity. The PRO Act would also significantly add to union's leverage in the bargaining process. It would allow intermittent and possibly partial strikes and slowdowns. It prohibits permanent replacement of strikers. It makes pre-strike lockouts by contractors unlawful. T^a ZCcCeî^a ž î pe^a-î ap-iž Xp- îžžp Cî^aCpeižY -C5=^a ap î-5îCe

they are limited to work to be done at the site of construction. Meaning, union-only subcontracting agreements that apply only at the site of construction but not to off -site operations such as pre-fabrication or other non -construction work are lawful. The PRO Act would delete Section 8(e), making union-only clauses lawful in all respects in all places. Because such clauses would be lawful, a union could strike or picket in order to force a contractor to agree to off-site union-only restrictions.

The goal in most bargaining situations is to reach agreement on a new contract before expiration of the current contract. However, if the parties are unable to reach agreement, each has economic weapons to leverage their positions. The union may strike

operations in order to put pressure on the union to agree to its proposals. The Pro Act would make it
employment from employees in order to influence the position of such employees or the representative
the context of a whipsaw strike [where only some contractors in a multiemployer group but not all have
been struck. Regardless, the elimination of offensive lockouts gives unions all of the cards as to the
timing and use of this economic weapon.

Third, the PRO Act would prohibit unilateral implementation of proposals by an employer when the
parties reach an impasse in bargaining. Under current law, once bargaining parties have reached a bona
fide impasse after bargaining in good faith, the employer may implement its final offer. The PRO Act
would instead require
agreement. ⁹⁰ The prospect of unilateral implementation is valuable leverage, because it keeps the union
at the table, bargaining so as not to reach impasse. The removal of the threat of unilateral implementation
removes the incentive for the union to bargain for anything other than the terms the union wants,
because all current terms must be maintained and could not legally be replaced until a new agreement
is reached. Although continued bargaining may delay more favorable terms for the union, they would
never have to agree to less favorable terms. And, because employers could not offensively lock out
employees in the absence of a strike, the status quo would continue indefi

organization, to meet and negotiate within 10 days of a demand, mediate on request if there is no contract after 90 days, and settle the contract by arbitration after an additional 30 -day period. A three-member arbitration panel would be empowered to decide the terms of the contract X f C e a - ž a

and prospects;¹³ X C C Y a = ž C Ů i e a Ñ “ p 4 a = c “ Z p Ñ - i ž p “ - i a C p e ž i e 2 ž C e ž

of living; X C Ê Y a = c “ Z p Ñ ž i i C Z C a Ñ a p ž 2 ž a i C e a = c ž Z Ê ž F a = C - 4 i c C Z C

wages and benefits they earn from the employer; and (v) the wages and benefits other employers in the ž i c 2 ž C e ž ž “ - p Ê C a = C - c “ Z p Ñ ž

Key on the parties by this panel would be effective for two years. It is unclear from the bill whether this would apply to existing relationships which are converted from Section 8(f) to Section 9(a) (by agreement/recognition or through an election) , but it certainly could be argued that it does.¹⁴ The impact is that unions will have little reason to agree to an c “ Z p Ñ - i ž “ - p “ p ž i Z ž Ě = e a = Ñ V e p Ě a = i a i 5 - p 2 “ p 4 a p a k e ů a č ž ů i C Z Z C c “ p

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Current remedies for unfair labor practices are generally limited to cease-and-desist orders (stop doing something unlawful) , notice postings, orders to take some affirmative action (such as reinstatement of a terminated employee), and back pay remedies where an employment loss is indicated. Other available remedies depend on the nature of the violation but may include more extraordinary things like making an employer read a notice posting to employees or ordering bargaining in certain egregious violations in election cases. The PRO Act would dramatically increase the remedies and penalties available under the NLRA.

The PRO Act would require statutory remedies C e i ž ž p 4 C ž - C c C e i a C p e F - a i Z C i a C p e F p a = - ž - C p 2 ž p e p 5 C C back pay (without reduction for interim earnings or failure to earn interim earnings), front pay, consequential damages (indirect or special damages), and an additional amount of liquidated damages equal to two times the amount of damages awarded .

In addition, the PRO Act would authorize civil penalties, in addition to any other remedy, of up to \$50,000 per violation and up to \$100,000 in certain cases (discrimination, retaliation, or cases of discharge or f p a = - ž - C p 2 ž p e p c C = i - c ů i ž i ž a h a s b e e n f o u n d i n t h e p r e c e d i n g f i v e y e a r s . The PRO Act also i Z Z p Ě ž 4 p - i e c “ Z p Ñ - i ž C - a p - ž p - p 4 4 C - ž a p = i Ě “ - ž p e them for civil penalties if they directed or committed the violation, established a poli cy that led to the violation, or had actual or constructive knowledge of and authority to prevent the violation and failed to

¹³ T a C ž 2 e Z i - Ě = a = - a = C ž Ě p 2 Z - • 2 C - a = c “ Z p Ñ - a p f p “ e C a ž p p V ž g a p ž = p Ě C otherwise be required in bargaining unless the employer claimed economic distress or an inability to pay in response to union demands.

¹⁴ For example, the bargaining mandate begins Ě = e i 2 e C p e = i ž recognized or certified as a representative i ž 4 C e C e ž a C p e X i Y K g Arguably this could include a newly recognized or certified 8(f) to 9(a) employer.

¹⁵ 1 = s g a c i V ž C a 2 e Z i Ě 4 2 Z a p C ž à p C ê N ‘ a ’ e ó P “ 8 ž By # 0 à ° @ o a 9 2 u u / F 3 i

situations where one employer has even indirect control over the terms and conditions of employment of another person. The PRO Act has reserved authority to control such terms and conditions. For example, if a contractor requires that its subcontractor comply with wage and hour obligations and health and safety requirements, and reserves the right to audit for compliance, is the contractor now a joint employer for the subcontractor's labor practices and bargaining obligations? To this end, the PRO Act specifically states that, following a finding that indirect or reserved control standing alone can be sufficient given specific facts and circumstances that might require the contractor to assume additional legal obligations and penalties on behalf of others.

Many parts of the PRO Act are recycled bits of previously failed legislation or administrative rulemaking. One such provision relates to certain reporting requirements under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) that were the subject to the so-called Persuader Rule promulgated by the Department of Labor (DOL) in 2016 and rescinded in 2018, which would have required reporting of activities where an object thereof is, directly or indirectly to persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or persuade employees as to the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. However, the LMRDA has always required reporting of activities between persons who engage in direct contact with employees (reportable) and everything else (not reportable). However, t

Giving employers less time to react to election petitions, it would allow organizing of only micro-units (small portions) of a workplace at a time, it would make it easier for employees to discuss the merits of unionization with their coworkers and to allow them to use email and other electronic communication systems and devices for protected activities including union organizing, and it would allow the union to determine the method and place of voting in elections, including by mail ballots or electronic voting.¹⁸ All of these changes are intended to make organizing easier and lead to the organization of more workplaces. Union contractors may feel that organizing their open-shop competitors would be a positive thing. However, there are potential drawbacks to having employers organized by individual elections under the PRO Act in the construction industry.¹⁹

Consider, for example, the effect that an influx of individually organized contractors could have on local area agreements. One of the benefits of construction industry agreements is that they are usually done on a multiemployer basis [through membership agreements where contractors agree to be bound by the multiemployer agreement. Most union contractors are subject to the same terms for the same type of work through the same agreements. However, when a contractor is organized by election and the union is certified as the Section 9(a) representative, a duty to bargain in good faith for a contract attaches to both the employer and to the union in Section 8(f) relationships. Instead, the employer may insist on bargaining an individual agreement, with separate and distinct terms from the multiemployer agreement. And, with the PRO Act, the parties themselves may not have control over the terms of the final agreement.

procedures it may not want to agree to and it may well not be forced into hiring hall provisions. In addition, there could be differences in wage rates, other benefits like health care, overtime for hours worked over eight in a day, rates for weekend make-up work, and any other term and condition of employment. As pointed out in H i ž2009 paper, the uniformity of area agreements could be undermined and the possibility exists that previously open shop contractors will be more competitive than historically union contractors while bidding in the union contractor space . The unions should also be concerned about different contract terms